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Abstract
While most of the literature concerned with indeterminacy and en-
dogenous cycles is based on the restrictive assumption of a representative
consumer, some recent contributions have investigated the role of hetero-
geneous agents in dynamics. This paper adds to this latter strand of the
literature by highlighting the eﬀects of heterogeneity in consumers’ prefer-
ences within an overlapping generations economy with capital accumula-
tion, endogenous labor supply and consumption in both periods. Using a
mean-preserving approach to heterogeneity, we show that increasing the
dispersion of propensity to save decreases macroeconomic volatility, by
narrowing down the range of parameter values compatible with indeter-
minacy and ruling out expectations-driven fluctuations under a suﬃciently
large heterogeneity.
JEL classification : C62, E32.
Keywords : Endogenous fluctuations, heterogeneous preferences, mean-
preserving dispersion, overlapping generations.
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, several papers have investigated conditions for inde-
terminacy and endogenous cycles in intertemporal general equilibrium models.1
One of the criticisms of this approach concerns the assumption of a representa-
tive agent as the average behavior of either an infinitely-lived population or a
∗We would like to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Jean-Michel Grand-
mont for very helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Marco Arnone, Eleni Iliopulos
and participants to conferences and seminars where this paper was presented. All remaining
errors are our own.
†Corresponding author. EQUIPPE, Département d’économie, Université de Lille 1, Bât.
SH2, Cité Scientifique, 59655 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France. Tel: (33) 3 20 43 70 12.
EPEE, Université d’Evry. E-mail: stefano.bosi@univ-lille1.fr.
‡Université Paris 1 and CNRS, Paris School of Economics, Centre d’Economie de la Sor-
bonne, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. Tel: (33) 1 44 07 81 99. Fax:
(33) 1 44 07 82 31. E-mail: seegmu@univ-paris1.fr.
1For a survey, the reader is referred to Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
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finite-horizon generation. How the dynamic properties of the model depend on
such a restrictive approach has been seldom explained.
Some recent papers have introduced heterogeneous infinitely-lived agents
in dynamic models with capital accumulation. Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne
(2001), Ghiglino (2005), Bosi and Seegmuller (2006) and Ghiglino and Venditti
(2006) have focused on the role of consumers’ diversity in the occurrence of
optimal cycles, whereas Ghiglino and Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino and Olszak-
Duquenne (2005) were mainly concerned with its influence on indeterminacy.2
All these papers prove that heterogeneity matters for endogenous fluctuations,
but no clear-cut results seem to emerge.
Similar conclusions hold in the overlapping generations literature. For in-
stance, Ghiglino and Tvede (1995) study an exchange economy with many con-
sumers and commodities.
In this paper, we connect the two previous types of contributions by analyz-
ing an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous consumers and capital
accumulation. The model describes a competitive economy, populated by con-
sumers living for two periods, supplying labor when young and consuming dur-
ing their whole life. As in d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet
(1995), Seegmuller (2004) and Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), pref-
erences are homogeneous and non-separable in current and future consumption,
but separable in leisure. In this context, parameters of economic significance,
such as the propensity to save or the elasticity of labor supply, emerge naturally.
While the dynamic consequences of heterogeneity in technologies or in en-
dowments have been relatively more studied, we introduce heterogeneity through
two types of consumers who diﬀer only in their propensities to save. In order
to assess only the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the occurrence of endogenous fluc-
tuations, we adopt a mean-preserving approach, while increasing consumers’
dispersion. We also contribute to a recent debate on the existing link between
indeterminacy and the degree of propensity to save in overlapping generations
economies characterized by a representative consumer.3
The geometrical method developed by Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder
(1998) is convenient to analyze the eﬀects of heterogeneity on local indeter-
minacy and local bifurcations. Under constant returns to scale, we find that
increasing heterogeneity reduces the range of parameter values (elasticity of
labor supply, capital-labor substitution) where indeterminacy occurs. In par-
ticular, fluctuations due to self-fulfilling prophecies no longer occur when the
labor supply is suﬃciently elastic. In addition, we prove that, beyond a thresh-
old of saving rate dispersion, indeterminacy is definitely ruled out. We conclude
that under constant returns, heterogeneity of preferences stabilizes endogenous
2 In order to account for binding financing or borrowing constraints, some economists have
introduced another kind of heterogeneity, through discount rates, in infinite-horizon models.
See, among others, Woodford (1986), Becker and Foias (1987, 1994) and Sorger (1994).
3 In this respect, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006) show that indeterminacy requires
a suﬃciently high propensity to save in economies with constant returns to scale or capital
externalities, whereas this is no longer the case with labor externalities (Lloyd-Braga, Nourry
and Venditti (2006)).
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fluctuations.
However, under constant returns and without heterogeneity, the emergence
of endogenous fluctuations requires two quite restrictive conditions in overlap-
ping generations economies: namely, weak substitution between capital and
labor4 and high propensity to save5. In their recent contribution, Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti (2006) prove that these restrictions are no longer needed
in the presence of productive labor externalities. On the one side, (mild) la-
bor externalities make the parameters range more plausible, and, on the other
side, they allow us to check the robustness of results in economies characterized
by increasing returns, even if expectations-driven fluctuations require slightly
diﬀerent conditions.
Finally, we show that indeterminacy becomes less likely under a higher de-
gree of heterogeneity, because the range of parameter values for indeterminacy
shrinks. Moreover, just like under constant returns, indeterminacy no longer
occurs for a suﬃciently elastic labor supply and it is ruled out when the disper-
sion of the propensity to save becomes large enough. Therefore, in contrast to
most of the existing results, we provide clear-cut conditions about the influence
of heterogeneity on endogenous fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model
and define the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted to the existence
of a steady state. In section 4, we analyze local dynamics assuming, at first,
constant returns and, then, increasing returns. Concluding remarks are provided
in section 5, while computational details are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
Heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences is introduced in a discrete time over-
lapping generations model with capital accumulation (t = 1, 2, . . .). Markets are
supposed to be perfectly competitive.
In contrast to the consumers’ side, the production sector is homogeneous:
A representative firm is supposed to produce a unique final good by means of
a constant returns to scale technology which employs capital (kt−1) and labor
(lt). Production is also aﬀected by aggregate labor externalities ψ (l).6 The
amount of final good yt, yielded in period t, is given by yt = Aψ (lt) f (at) lt,
where A > 0 is a scaling parameter. f and at ≡ kt−1/lt represent an intensive
production function and the capital intensity, respectively. On the technological
side, we further assume:
Assumption 1 The production function f (a) is continuous for a ≥ 0, positive-
valued and continuously diﬀerentiable as many times as needed for a > 0, with
4This assumption is not in keeping with some recent empirical studies. See, in particular,
Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000).
5This condition has been criticized by, among others, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004).
6Capital externalities are not introduced in the economy because, as it is shown by Caz-
zavillan and Pintus (2006) and Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), they fail to promote
endogenous fluctuations in overlapping generations models with consumption in both periods.
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f 00 (a) < 0 < f 0 (a).
The externality function ψ (l) is continuous for l ≥ 0, positive-valued and dif-
ferentiable as many times as needed for l > 0. Moreover, εψ (l) ≡ lψ0 (l) /ψ (l) ≥
0.
Notice that when εψ (l) = 0, there are no externalities and returns to scale
become constant, whereas under εψ (l) > 0, returns to scale are increasing to a
degree 1 + εψ (l).
As usual, the representative firm maximizes the profit, which determines
the real interest rate rt and the real wage wt. If we set ρ (a) ≡ f 0 (a) and
ω (a) ≡ f (a)− af 0 (a), we get immediately:
rt = Aψ (lt) ρ (at) ≡ r (kt−1, lt)
wt = Aψ (lt)ω (at) ≡ w (kt−1, lt)
Two identities of interest relate the elasticities of ρ (a) and ω (a) to the
capital share in total income α (a) ≡ af 0 (a) /f (a) ∈ (0, 1) and to the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution σ (a) > 0:7
aρ0 (a) /ρ (a) = − [1− α (a)] /σ (a) (1)
aω0 (a) /ω (a) = α (a) /σ (a) (2)
On the consumption side, there are overlapping generations of two-period-
lived consumers. Population is constant and the total size of a generation is
normalized to unity. In order to keep things as simple as possible, but without
loosing generality, we reduce consumers’ heterogeneity to two types of agents,
labeled with i = 1, 2. We note λi ∈ [0, 1] the relative size of the ith class of
consumers, which is held constant over time. By definition, λ1 + λ2 = 1. Each
agent supplies labor only in the first period of life, saves through productive
capital and consumes in both periods.8 Preferences of a consumer of type i are
summarized by a non-separable utility function in consumption of both periods,
but separable in consumption and labor:
Ui (ci1t, ci2t+1) /Bi − vi (lit) (3)
where ci1t (ci2t+1) is the consumption during the first (second) period of life, lit
the labor supply and Bi > 0 a scaling parameter.9
Assumption 2 The function Ui (ci1, ci2) is continuous for ci1 ≥ 0 and ci2 ≥ 0
with continuous derivatives of any required order for ci1 > 0 and ci2 > 0. More-
over, Ui (ci1, ci2) is increasing in ci1 and ci2, strictly quasi-concave, homoge-
neous of degree one and such that the underlying indiﬀerence curves never cross
the axes.
7 Identities (1) and (2) are straightforwardly deduced from 1/σ (a) = aω0 (a) /ω (a) −
aρ0 (a) /ρ (a) and ω0 (a) = −aρ0 (a).
8The length of a period (half a life) accounts for the full capital depreciation during the
period.
9 Similar preferences have been used, among others, by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira
and Gérard-Varet (1995), Seegmuller (2004), Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006).
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The function vi (li) is continuous for 0 ≤ li ≤ Li with continuous derivatives
of any required order for 0 < li < Li, where Li denotes the positive, finite or even
infinite, labor endowment. Furthermore, we assume that vi (li) is increasing and
convex, and satisfies limli→0 v0i (li) = 0 and limli→Li v
0
i (li) = +∞.
In the youth, the labor income wtlit is consumed (ci1t) and saved (kit). In
the retirement age, the capital income rt+1kit is consumed (ci2t+1). So, the ith
type consumer faces two budget constraints:
ci1t + kit = wtlit (4)
ci2t+1 = rt+1kit (5)
Consumers compute the optimal levels of consumption and saving by maximiz-
ing the utility function (3) under the budget constraints (4) and (5). Using the
intertemporal condition:10
Ui1 (ci1t, ci2t+1)
Ui2 (ci1t, ci2t+1)
= rt+1 (6)
we find the optimal levels:
ci1t = [1− si (rt+1)]wtlit (7)
ci2t+1 = rt+1si (rt+1)wtlit (8)
kit = si (rt+1)wtlit (9)
where si (rt+1) ∈ (0, 1) is the propensity to save and 1−si (rt+1) the propensity
to consume (when young).11 The consumption ratio becomes a function, say qi,
of the real interest rate
ci1t
ci2t+1
=
1− si (rt+1)
si (rt+1) rt+1
≡ qi (rt+1)
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ηi > 0 can be viewed as elasticity
of qi (in absolute value):
ηi (rt+1) = −
q0i (rt+1) rt+1
qi (rt+1)
= 1 +
s0i (rt+1) rt+1
si (rt+1) [1− si (rt+1)]
(10)
Of course, si is decreasing for 0 < ηi < 1 (intertemporal complementarity),
increasing for ηi > 1 (intertemporal substitutability) and constant for ηi = 1:
Savings increase (decrease) with respect to the interest rate under intertemporal
substitutability (complementarity), whereas they don’t depend on rt+1 when
ηi = 1.
Substituting (7) and (8) into the function Ui (ci1t, ci2t+1), we get the con-
sumption utility level for a unit of labor income wtlit = 1: U∗i (rt+1) /Bi with
10Where Uij ≡ ∂Ui (x1, x2) /∂xj denotes a marginal utility.
11More details are provided in the Appendix.
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U∗i (r) ≡ Ui (1− si (r) , si (r) r). As shown in the Appendix, the saving rate is
also the elasticity of U∗i :
rU∗0i (r) /U
∗
i (r) = si (r) ∈ (0, 1)
By definition of U∗i , the consumption-leisure arbitrage for a consumer of type
i simplifies to:
U∗i (rt+1)wt = Biv
0
i (lit)
Let εvi (li) ≡ liv00i (li) /v0i (li) > 0 be the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
labor (Assumption 2): The labor supply increases in the real wage with elasticity
1/εvi (li).
Since (aggregate) capital is given by kt = λ1k1t + λ2k2t, where kit is de-
termined by (9), we can define an intertemporal equilibrium as a sequence
(kt−1, lt)
∞
t=1 that meets the following conditions:
kt = [λ1s1 (r (kt, lt+1)) l1t + λ2s2 (r (kt, lt+1)) l2t]w (kt−1, lt) (11)
lt = λ1l1t + λ2l2t (12)
where the heterogeneous labor supplies are given by:
lit ≡ v0−1i [U∗i (r (kt, lt+1))w (kt−1, lt) /Bi] ≡ li (kt−1, lt, kt, lt+1) (13)
We remark that the capital kt−1 is the predetermined variable of this two-
dimensional dynamic system (11)-(12). The intertemporal sequence of kt−1 and
lt, enables us to determine all the other variables, namely lit, kit, ci1t, ci2t, yt.
In order to study the local dynamics and analyze the role of heterogeneity
in preferences on the stability properties of the economy, we first establish the
existence of a steady state and then we linearize the system in a neighborhood.
3 Steady state
A stationary state of dynamic system (11)-(12) is a solution (k, l) of the system:
k = [λ1s1 (r (k, l)) l1 + λ2s2 (r (k, l)) l2]w (k, l)
l = λ1l1 + λ2l2
with
li = v0−1i [U
∗
i (r (k, l))w (k, l) /Bi]
Following Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998), we prove the exis-
tence of a normalized steady state such that k = l1 = l2 = 1, that is l = 1, by
setting appropriately the scaling parameters A,B1, B2 > 0.12
12For the sake of simplicity, we focus on local dynamics around the normalized steady state
without characterizing the possible existence of other stationary states.
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Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a steady state of sys-
tem (11)-(12) such that k = l1 = l2 = 1, and therefore l = 1, if and only
if:
lim
A→+∞
g (A) > 1/ (ψ (1) [f (1)− f 0 (1)]) (14)
where
g (A) ≡ A [λ1s1 (Aψ (1) f 0 (1)) + λ2s2 (Aψ (1) f 0 (1))] (15)
and A, Bi are the unique solutions of:
g (A) = 1/ (ψ (1) [f (1)− f 0 (1)]) (16)
Bi = U∗i (r (1, 1))w (1, 1) /v
0
i (1) (17)
Proof. A steady state k = l1 = l2 = 1 is defined by (16)-(17). To establish the
existence of this steady state, we need to prove that there is a unique solution
A > 0, Bi > 0 to these equations. The function g (A) defined by (15) is
continuous and increasing (see the Appendix) and limA→0 g (A) = 0. Therefore,
according to inequality (14), there is a unique solution A > 0 to equation (16).
Moreover, since U∗i (r (1, 1))w (1, 1) /v
0
i (1) > 0, one can immediately see that
there exist unique solutions Bi > 0 to (17).
Throughout the rest of the paper, Proposition 1 will be supposed to hold
and no longer referred.
4 Local dynamics
In order to know how heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences could aﬀect the
occurrence of endogenous fluctuations, we study the local dynamics. Two main
findings deserve attention:
• An increase of heterogeneity in consumers’ propensities to save stabilizes
the economy by narrowing down the range of parameter values consistent
with the multiplicity of equilibria, and hence with fluctuations due to self-
fulfilling expectations;
• A suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity can definitely eliminate indeterminacy.
In order to characterize the local dynamics, we diﬀerentiate the system (11)-
(12) in a neighborhood of the steady state (k, l) = (1, 1) with l1 = l2 = 1. In
what follows, we define α ≡ α (1), σ ≡ σ (1), εψ ≡ εψ (1), si ≡ si (Aψ (1) f 0 (1))
and ηi ≡ ηi (Aψ (1) f 0 (1)), while εvi denotes the elasticity of v0i (li) evaluated at
the steady state.
Notice that propensities si, elasticities ηi and εvi resume the fundamental
information about preferences and, therefore, about consumers’ heterogeneity.
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For simplicity, we will focus on the case with no heterogeneity in the elastici-
ties of labor disutility.13 Finally, we also assume intertemporal substitutability
between consumption in both periods for each type of agent.14
Assumption 3 εv1 = εv2 ≡ εv and ηi ≥ 1.
Denoting by J the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state (k, l) =
(1, 1), local dynamics are represented by a linear system (dkt/k, dlt+1/l)
T =
J (dkt−1/k, dlt/l)
T .
In the sequel, we exploit the fact that the trace T and the determinant D of
the Jacobian matrix are the sum and the product of the eigenvalues, respectively.
Following Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998), the stability properties of
the system, that is, the location of the eigenvalues with respect to the unit circle,
will be characterized in the (T,D)-plane (see Figures 1-6).15 More precisely, we
evaluate the characteristic polynomial P (μ) ≡ μ2 − Tμ + D = 0 at −1, 0, 1.
On the line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1, i.e., P (−1) = 1 + T +D = 0.
On the line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1, i.e., P (1) = 1 − T + D = 0.
On the segment [BC], the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates with a unit
modulus, i.e., D = 1 and |T | < 2. The steady state is a sink when D < 1
and |T | < 1 + D. It is a saddle point when |1 +D| < |T |. It is a source
otherwise. Therefore, the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if
(T,D) is inside the triangle (ABC) and is locally determinate otherwise.16 A
transcritical bifurcation generically occurs when (T,D) crosses the line (AC), a
flip bifurcation generically occurs when (T,D) crosses the line (AB), whereas a
Hopf bifurcation generically emerges when (T,D) crosses the segment [BC].
13Recently, Bosi and Seegmuller (2005) have characterized the role of heterogeneity in labor
disutility on the occurrence of local indeterminacy in a closely related framework. Considering
an overlapping generations model with consumption only in the second period of life, they have
shown that consumers’ preferences are summarized by a weighted elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the real wage: In other terms, a mean-preserving increase of heterogeneity
does not aﬀect local dynamics.
14A similar assumption is made by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004, 2006) and Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti (2006).
15Dynamic systems can be approximated and represented by a Jacobian matrix which in
turn can be conveniently written in terms of elasticities and fundamental parameters. The
geometrical approach focuses on some elasticity of economic significance and simplifies the
bifurcation analysis whenever the image of the elasticity range is linear or simple-shaped in
the (T,D)-plane. Moreover, few informations are needed to locate their intersections with the
critical lines (AB) and (AC), and the critical segment [BC].
16 In our model, multiple equilibria converge to the sink (local indeterminacy), while a
unique equilibrium converges to the saddle point (local determinacy). The source is also an
equilibrium, if the initial capital corresponds to the stationary solution (but local determinacy
has now measure zero).
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The determinant D and the trace T of matrix J are given by:17
D =
α
s
1 + εv
1− α+ σεψ
> 0 (18)
T =
α+ s (1− α) + (s− σ − εs) εψ + [σ + (1− α) εs] εv +
³
1− α− εψεv
´
h
s
s (1− α+ σεψ)
(19)
where:
• s ≡ λ1s1 + λ2s2 is the average propensity to save weighted by the popu-
lation sizes;
• εs = λ1s1λ1s1+λ2s2 εs1 + λ2s2λ1s1+λ2s2 εs2 is the elasticity of the average saving
rate s and can be reinterpreted as a weighted average of the individual
elasticities εsi ≡ rs0i (r) /si (r) = (1− si) (ηi − 1);
• h ≡ λ1 (s1 − s)2 + λ2 (s2 − s)2 is the variance of the propensities to save.
To understand the role of heterogeneity in preferences for local dynamics,
we need to define a significant measure of heterogeneity and observe the conse-
quences of raising this measure.
The propensity to save si is an informative parameter that captures the
dynamic eﬀect of preferences. As stressed by Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004,
2006) and Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), this parameter plays a key
role on the occurrence of indeterminacy in overlapping generations economies
with a representative consumer.18
To take one step forward, we address a worthwhile question: What are
the implications on local indeterminacy when one raises the dispersion of saving
rates in an economy with heterogeneous consumers? Since the most satisfactory
way of appreciating the role heterogeneity is to keep the first order moments as
given, we preserve explicitly the mean s of the propensities to save and the mean
of their elasticities εs,19 while raising their variance h, our significant measure
of heterogeneity.
The main results of the paper are proved in the following: More heterogeneity
in consumers’ preferences reduces the range of parameters for indeterminacy
and can rule out endogenous fluctuations. The cases of constant and increasing
returns to scale are successively studied.
4.1 Constant returns (εψ = 0)
Under constant returns to scale, the production sector does not benefit from
labor externalities, i.e., εψ = 0. Local dynamics, that is, the occurrence of
17More details are provided in the Appendix.
18 In order to obtain indeterminacy, the propensity to save is required to be suﬃciently high
under constant returns to scale or capital externalities, while such restriction is no longer
needed in the presence of labor externalities.
19Note that keeping εs as constant is possible through an appropriate choice of η1 and η2.
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indeterminacy and endogenous cycles, are characterized through an increase of
heterogeneity in preferences.
According to empirical estimates, the capital share in total income α is
supposed to be smaller than one half. In addition, we consider a suﬃciently
high average propensity to save s and we assume the elasticities of intertemporal
substitution ηi to be suﬃciently close to one.
Assumption 4 α < 1/2, εs < α/ (1− α) < s.
Consider the general expressions (18) and (19), and let
D0 ≡ α/ [(1− α) s] (20)
T0 ≡ 1 +D0 + h/s2 (21)
be the determinant and the trace when the labor supply is infinitely elastic
(εv = 0) under constant returns (εψ = 0). Still using (18) and (19), the trace
and the determinant can now be written as:
D = D0 (1 + εv)
T = T0 +D0εv/S (σ)
where
S (σ) ≡ α/ [σ + (1− α) εs] (22)
When the bifurcation parameter εv varies from 0 to +∞, the pair (T,D)
describes a half-line ∆0 in the (T,D)-plane, with origin (T0,D0) and slope S (σ).
The origin (T0,D0) does not depend on σ, while D0 and the slope S don’t
depend on h (see (20), (21) and (22)). The two parameters σ and h characterize
unambiguously the position of ∆0: When σ increases, ∆0 makes a clockwise
rotation around the invariant starting point (T0,D0), while ∆0 moves on the
right making a horizontal translation, when h increases.
More precisely, on the one hand, the slope S (σ) decreases from S (0) =
α/ [(1− α) εs], which is greater than 1 under Assumption 4, to 0, as long as σ
tends to +∞, and S (σ) = 1 for σ = α − (1− α) εs ≡ σT . On the other hand,
T0 increases with h, while D0 remains invariant and belongs to (0, 1) under
Assumption 4.
According to (21), without heterogeneity (h = 0) the starting point (T0,D0)
is on the line (AC) between the horizontal axis and C. Moreover, when σ < σT ,
the half-line ∆0 lies above the line (AC) and crosses the segment [BC] for
εv = s (1− α) /α− 1 ≡ εvH , whereas ∆0 lies below the line (AC) for all σ > σT
(see Figure 1).
A positive degree of heterogeneity in the propensities to save, makes h strictly
positive. The origin (T0,D0) turns out to lie below the line (AC).
First consider a slight degree of heterogeneity:
h < h1 ≡ s
1− α
α
µ
s− α
1− α
¶µ
α
1− α − εs
¶
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Figure 1: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and no heterogeneity (h = 0)
and define εvT ≡ h (1− α) / [s (α− (1− α) εs − σ)] as the bifurcation value for
εv corresponding to the intersection of ∆0 and (AC). We also note that the
critical value of σ such that ∆0 goes through C is given by:
σC ≡ α− (1− α) εs −
1− α
s (1− α) /α− 1
h
s
∈ (0, σT )
Therefore, when σ < σC , the half-line ∆0, which starts below the line (AC),
first crosses (AC) below C and then the segment [BC]. When σC < σ < σT ,
the slope S (σ) remains greater than 1, but ∆0 crosses now the line (AC) above
C. Finally, when σ > σT , the slope S (σ) becomes smaller than 1 and ∆0 lies
entirely below the line (AC) (see Figure 2).
Assume now a higher degree of heterogeneity h ≥ h1: The critical value
σC becomes negative. This means that, whatever σ (even close to 0), the half-
line ∆0 lies outside the triangle (ABC), on the right side of C (see Figure 3).
Therefore, when σ < σT , the half-line ∆0, which starts below the line (AC),
crosses (AC) above C. When σ ≥ σT , as seen, ∆0 lies entirely below (AC).
11
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Figure 2: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and heterogeneity with h > 0 not too large
These results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 (Constant returns) If Assumptions 3-4 are satisfied, the fol-
lowing generically holds.
1. No heterogeneity (h = 0).
(i) When 0 < σ < σT , the steady state is a sink for 0 < εv < εvH ,
undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at εv = εvH , is a source for εv > εvH .
(ii) When σ > σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
2. Moderate heterogeneity (0 < h < h1).
(i) When 0 < σ < σC , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a sink for εvT <
εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at εv = εvH , is source for
εv > εvH .
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Figure 3: Constant returns (εψ = 0) and heterogeneity with h > h1
(ii) When σC < σ < σT , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a source for εv >
εvT .
(iii) When σ ≥ σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
3. Large heterogeneity (h ≥ h1).
(i) When 0 < σ < σT , the steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvT ,
undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a source for εv >
εvT .
(ii) When σ ≥ σT , the steady state is a saddle for all εv > 0.
Proposition 2 shows that without heterogeneity in the propensities to save
(case 1), expectations-driven fluctuations need not only a weak capital-labor
substitution (σ < σT ≤ α), but also a suﬃciently elastic labor supply with
respect to the real wage. In particular, indeterminacy can emerge under an
infinitely elastic labor supply, that is, a linear disutility of labor (εv = 0).
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Under a moderate degree of heterogeneity (case 2), on the one side, the
emergence of endogenous fluctuations requires a weaker elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor (σ < σC < σT ). Furthermore, since σC linearly
decreases with h, the larger the heterogeneity degree, the smaller the range of
capital-labor substitution compatible with indeterminacy. On the other side,
heterogeneity has also a negative eﬀect on indeterminacy by reducing the range
(εvT , εvH ), given σ < σC . If the higher bound εvH does not depend on the degree
of heterogeneity,20 there is now a lower bound εvT > 0, that increases with the
level of heterogeneity. This means that endogenous fluctuations are no longer
possible under highly or even infinitely elastic labor supply, in sharp contrast
with most of the existing results, mainly found using one-sector models, which
suggest that a more elastic labor supply promotes fluctuations due to animal
spirits.
Eventually, when heterogeneity becomes suﬃciently high (case 3), the oc-
currence of endogenous fluctuations is ruled out. In fact, indeterminacy (and
Hopf bifurcations as well) no longer occurs, when the second order moment h
is higher than a threshold.21
We are now able to provide an interpretation of these results, by focusing
on the existence of self-fulfilling expectations. For simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the case where the propensities to save are constant, i.e., η1 = η2 =
1, so entailing εs = 0. Assume that agents coordinate their expectations on
an increase of the future real interest rate. Since dlit/li = (si/εv) (drt+1/r),
each agent increases his labor supply. Therefore, the eﬀect on the aggregate
labor supply is determined by dlt/l = λ1dl1t/l1 + λ2dl2t/l2 = (s/εv) (drt+1/r).
Noticing
kt = (λ1s1l1t + λ2s2l2t)wt
we observe that an increase of labor supply of each type of agent has two eﬀects
on capital accumulation, one through the individual labor supplies and their
impacts on the terms in parentheses, another one through the aggregate labor
supply and its impact on the wage. Taking into account these two channels, the
variation of capital accumulation as a consequence of an increase in the expected
real interest rate, depends on two opposite eﬀects defined by:
1. dktk =
³
s
εv
+ hsεv
´
drt+1
r ;
2. dktk = −
α
σ
s
εv
drt+1
r .
Expectations are self-fulfilling if capital accumulation reduces, because, in
this case, the future real interest rate increases. Therefore, the second (negative)
eﬀect has to dominate the first one. Without heterogeneity (h = 0), this requires
σ < σT = α. However, increasing the degree of heterogeneity (h > 0) reinforces
the first eﬀect which promotes determinacy. This explains why, when consumers
20The invariance of εvH entails also that the instability range (εvH ,+∞) does not widen.
21We remark that, since 0 < si < 1, h is strictly less than 1/4 and thus the result established
in the third case of Proposition 2 matters, if either s or εs remain close to the bound α/ (1− α),
in order to ensure that h1 < 1/4.
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are heterogeneous, indeterminacy requires more restrictive conditions and can
be even ruled out. One can further notice that, by direct inspection of the first
eﬀect, the smaller εv, the more stringent the impact of heterogeneity.
As we have seen, the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations under constant
returns to scale requires at least two demanding conditions. On one hand, one
need a suﬃciently weak degree of substitution between capital and labor, which
is not in accordance with empirical results (see Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000)).
As shown in Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), this condition is no longer
required as soon as labor externalities are introduced in the production sector.
On the other hand, a too high propensity to save is open to criticism as well.22
However, as stressed also by Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), under
productive labor externalities, this assumption is no longer needed.
So there are at least two good reasons to study the case where returns to scale
are increasing under the eﬀect of labor externalities and to check the robustness
of the findings obtained under constant returns.
4.2 Increasing returns (εψ > 0)
Henceforth, we assume εψ > 0, yielding positive externalities and increasing
returns. In order to verify the robustness of our results, namely the positive
role of heterogeneity in preferences for equilibrium determinacy, we study how
local dynamics and the stability properties of the steady state vary in response
to a mean-preserving change in h, the variance of saving rates.
To keep matters as simple as possible, not only we maintain Assumption
3, but also we assume an average propensity to save neither too low nor too
high (as suggested by empirical evidence). In addition, according to the em-
pirical literature, a too weak capital-labor substitution is excluded (see Duﬀy
and Papageorgiou (2000)) and, as under constant returns to scale, a too large
intertemporal substitution is not allowed.
Assumption 5 Let εs < s < α/ (1− α) with s > 1−
¡
3−
√
1 + 8α
¢
/ [2 (1− α)],
and σ > max {α− (1− α) εs, (s− εs) / (1− s)}.
As above, we characterize the stability properties of the steady state and
the occurrence of bifurcations in the (T,D)-plane and we choose εv ∈ (0,+∞)
as bifurcation parameter to handle.
The analysis is made more diﬃcult by the non-linear term εψ/εv appearing
in (19). A direct inspection of (18) and (19) tells us that, as εv varies, (T,D)
describes two diﬀerent kind of curves for h = 0 and h > 0. In the first case, the
locus is a half-line, whereas in the second one, it becomes a branch of hyperbole.
For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to study first local dynamics without
heterogeneity and then to stress the main diﬀerences arising when h becomes
strictly positive.
22See, among others, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004).
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4.2.1 Representative agent (h = 0)
Assuming h = 0, let
D1 = α/ [s (1− α+ σεψ)] (23)
T1 = 1 +D1 (1− εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s] /α)
be the trace and the determinant when εv = 0 (infinitely elastic labor supply).
Using (18) and (19), the determinant D and the trace T simplify:
D = D1 (1 + εv) (24)
T = T1 +D1εv/S (σ) (25)
where S (σ) is still given by (22). When εv increases from 0 to +∞, (T,D)
describes a half-line ∆1 with origin (T1,D1) and slope S (σ), which is given by
(22) and belongs to (0, 1) under Assumption 5.
We compute two critical degrees of externality:
εψH ≡ [α− s (1− α)] / (σs)
εψF ≡ 2 [α+ s (1− α)] / [σ (1− s) + εs − s]
First we notice that Assumption 5 ensures εψH < εψF .
23 Moreover,
1− T1 +D1 = εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s]D1/α (26)
1 + T1 +D1 =
¡
εψF − εψ
¢
[σ (1− s) + εs − s]D1/α (27)
In order to locate the origin of∆1, we find from (24) thatD1 belongs to (0, 1)
when εψH < εψ. The last inequality in Assumption 5 implies that the right-
hand sides of (26) and (27) are positive if εψ > 0 and εψ < εψF , respectively.
So when εψH < εψ < εψF , the starting point (T1,D1) lies above the horizontal
axis inside (ABC) and, since T and D are both increasing in εv and the slope
of ∆1 belongs to (0, 1), the half-line ∆1 crosses the line (AC) or the segment
[BC].
In what follows, we define εvH and εvT the critical values of εv such that
D = 1 and 1− T +D = 0, respectively. From (24)-(25), it follows that:
εvH ≡ s (1− α+ σεψ) /α− 1 = 1/D1 − 1 (28)
εvT ≡ εψ [σ (1 + s) + εs − s] / [σ + (1− α) εs − α]
We notice that εvH < εvT if and only if:
εψ
∙
sσ − α σ (1 + s) + εs − s
σ + (1− α) εs − α
¸
< α− s (1− α) (29)
Under condition (29), the half-line lies above C, i.e., ∆1 crosses the segment
[BC] before the line (AC) (see Figure 4).24
23The inequality εψH < εψF is equivalent to (s− εs) [s (1− α)− α] <
σ

(1− α) s2 + (1 + 2α) s− α

. Under Assumption 5, the left-hand side is strictly neg-
ative, while the right-hand side is strictly positive.
24We observe that inequality (29) is compatible with εψH < εψ .
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Figure 4: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and no heterogeneity (h = 0)
We can now summarize the conditions for indeterminacy and endogenous
cycles when there is no heterogeneity in the propensities to save, i.e., h = 0.
Proposition 3 (Increasing returns without heterogeneity (h = 0)) If
Assumptions 3 and 5, and inequalities εψH < εψ < εψF and (29) are satisfied,
the following generically holds.
The steady state is a sink for 0 < εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at
εv = εvH , is a source for εvH < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical bifurcation
at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
Proposition 3 establishes that local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles
occur under small increasing returns, a weak propensity to save and substi-
tutable production factors.25 In this respect, as it has initially been proved by
Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti (2006), endogenous fluctuations arise under
25 If ψ > ψF , local indeterminacy is not excluded. However, since increasing returns are
required to be high, in contrast with empirical studies, we have omitted this case in Proposition
3.
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mild conditions in such overlapping generations economies. More specifically,
we observe that indeterminacy can occur if labor supply is suﬃciently elastic
(εv < εvH ).
4.2.2 Heterogeneity (h > 0)
Assume now that propensities to save are heterogeneous. By direct inspection
of equations (18) and (19), we remark that D does not depend on h, whereas
∂T/∂h > 0 if and only if εv > ε∗v ≡ εψ/ (1− α).
The analysis simplifies under an additional mild restriction.
Assumption 6
σ <
α/s
1− α +
1
ε∗v
µ
α/s
1− α − 1
¶
(30)
Condition (30) is not too restrictive: The elasticity of capital-labor substitu-
tion is bounded from above by a value that is greater than 1 under Assumption
5. Inequality (30) entails that εvH < ε
∗
v, where, as before, εvH is defined by
D = 1 and does not depend on h.
In order to characterize local dynamics when heterogeneity matters, we need
to know how the pair (T,D) moves in the plane when the bifurcation parameter
εv varies in the range (0,+∞). The new locus, say ∆2, is a branch of hyperbole
(instead of a half-line) which depends on the degree of heterogeneity.
Let γ ≡ α (1− σ) − (1− α+ εψ) (σ + εs − s). The system (18)-(19) gives
implicitly D as a function of T , D ≡ D (T ). For simplicity, we define the inverse
relation:
T (D) =
D1
α
∙
γ +
αD/D1
S (σ)
+
µ
1− α− εψ
D/D1 − 1
¶
h
s
¸
, with D > D1 (31)
We find easily that D (T ) is an increasing and convex function.26
In addition, we observe that limεv→0 (T,D) = (−∞,D1), that is, a hori-
zontal asymptote bounds from below ∆2 on the left side. On the right side,
limεv→+∞ (T,D) = (+∞,+∞). Moreover ∆2 crosses ∆1 from above only once,
exactly for εv = ε∗v (see Figure 5). This intersection point is invariant to h.
Two cases matters according to the location of ∆2 with respect to B. We
notice that ∆2 goes through B = (−2, 1), when
h2 ≡
γ + [σ + 2α+ (1− α) εs] /D1
αεψ/s− σ
¡
εψ − εψH
¢
(1− α)
σs
¡
εψ − εψH
¢
(32)
26Diﬀerentiating (31), we obtain:
T 0 (D) =
1
S (σ)
+
εψ
α (D/D1 − 1)2
h
s
> 0
T 00 (D) = −
2εψ
αD1 (D/D1 − 1)3
h
s
< 0
and, finally, D0 (T ) = 1/T 0 (D) > 0 and D00 (T ) = −T 00 (D) / [T 0 (D)]3 > 0.
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where D1 is given by (23).
When heterogeneity is moderate (0 < h < h2), ∆2 lies below B. By direct
inspection of Figure 5, we deduce that∆2 is below the line (AB) for 0 < εv < εvF
(high elasticity of labor supply). When εv goes through εvF , (T,D) crosses the
line (AB). (T,D) lies inside the triangle (ABC) for εvF < εv < εvH . (T,D)
crosses the segment [BC] when εv goes through εvH , and lies above (ABC)
for εvH < εv < εvT . After crossing the line (AC) when εv goes through εvT ,
eventually (T,D) lies on the right side of (AC) for εv > εvT (weak elasticity of
labor supply).27
On the contrary, when heterogeneity is large (h > h2), ∆2 lies above B (see
Figure 6). In this case, as εv moves from 0 to +∞, ∆2 starts on the left side of
the line (AB) (0 < εv < εvF ), crosses (AB) above B (εv = εvF ), goes through
the line (AC) (εv = εvT ) and definitely lies on the right-hand side of (AC)
(εv > εvT ).
Conditions for indeterminacy and endogenous cycles are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Increasing returns) If Assumptions 3, 5 and 6, and inequal-
ities εψH < εψ < εψF and (29) are satisfied, the following generically holds.
1. Moderate heterogeneity (0 < h < h2).
The steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvF , undergoes a flip bifurcation
at εv = εvF , is a sink for εvF < εv < εvH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation
at εv = εvH , is a source for εvH < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical
bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
2. Large heterogeneity (h > h2).
The steady state is a saddle for 0 < εv < εvF , undergoes a flip bifurcation
at εv = εvF , is a source for εvF < εv < εvT , undergoes a transcritical
bifurcation at εv = εvT , is a saddle for εv > εvT .
When a moderate degree of heterogeneity in the saving rates is introduced
(Proposition 4, case 1), indeterminacy no longer emerges for a highly elastic
labor supply. There is now a lower bound εvF for values of εv compatible with
indeterminacy. More precisely, indeterminacy arises if and only if the elasticity
εv belongs to the interval (εvF , εvH ). This interval shrinks with h, the degree of
heterogeneity. Indeed εvH does not depend on h, while εvF increases.
28 In other
terms, the range of elasticities of labor supply (1/εv) compatible with indeter-
minacy shrinks with h and heterogeneity in preferences stabilizes endogenous
fluctuations.
27As above, εvF , εvH and εvT are the values of the elasticity εv corresponding to the
intersections of ∆2 with (AB), [BC] and (AC), respectively. For briefness, we omit the
expression of εvT , whereas εvH is given by (28) and εvF by (40) in the Appendix.
28For a proof of ∂εvF /∂h > 0, see the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and heterogeneity with h > 0 not too
large
Furthermore, as under constant returns, indeterminacy is ruled out and the
equilibrium becomes unique when heterogeneity is suﬃciently large (Proposition
4, case 2).29
Therefore, we are allowed to conclude that, when consumers have heteroge-
neous preferences, indeterminacy requires more restrictive conditions and can
be eventually eliminated. In other words, heterogeneity stabilizes expectations-
driven fluctuations as it does under constant returns to scale, even if conditions
for indeterminacy look like diﬀerent.
29Notice that, since h < 1/4, the second case in Proposition 4 is of interest. In fact h2 can
be strictly less than 1/4 and becomes weak when εψ is suﬃciently close to εψH (see equation
(32)).
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Figure 6: Increasing returns (εψ > 0) and heterogeneity with h > h2
5 Conclusion
A few papers have recently analyzed the role of heterogeneity between consumers
in the stability properties of the path of capital accumulation, considering mod-
els with infinitely-lived agents. However, some authors have stressed the crucial
role of the propensity to save on the determinacy properties of equilibria in
overlapping generations economies with a representative consumer. This paper
encompasses both views: we analyze the influence of heterogeneity in prefer-
ences, through diﬀerent propensities to save, on the occurrence of endogenous
fluctuations, considering an overlapping generations economy with capital ac-
cumulation, consumption in both periods and elastic labor supply.
Using a mean-preserving measure of dispersion, we show that under constant
returns to scale, the introduction of heterogeneous propensities to save reduces
the range of parameter values for which fluctuations due to self-fulfilling prophe-
cies emerge. In particular, indeterminacy no longer occurs for a suﬃciently
elastic labor supply. One may conclude that heterogeneity stabilizes endoge-
21
nous fluctuations since they appear for a narrower range of parameter values.
Moreover, indeterminacy can even be ruled out, when heterogeneity becomes
greater than a certain threshold. Introducing productive labor externalities, we
prove the robustness of these results in the case of increasing returns to scale.
Our framework enables us to draw clear-cut conclusions about the influence
of heterogeneity in preferences on indeterminacy. In contrast with some opti-
mal growth models, where the planner’s solution is used to study the stability
eﬀects of heterogeneity (Ghiglino (2005), Ghiglino and Venditti (2006)), we fo-
cus directly on the market regime and make some assumptions on preferences
(homogeneity, separability) to derive standard parameters, like the propensity
to save and the elasticity of labor supply.
An additional promising step could be to extend this line of research to
market economies characterized by other forms of imperfections and analyze
whether heterogeneity robustly reduces the indeterminacy range and can elim-
inate expectation-driven fluctuations.
6 Appendix
Existence of si (rt+1). Equation (6) writes equivalently:
zi (ci1t/ci2t+1) ≡
Ui1 (ci1t/ci2t+1, 1)
Ui2 (1, ci2t+1/ci1t)
= rt+1
where zi is a strictly decreasing function. Then zi is invertible and ci1t =
z−1i (rt+1) ci2t+1. Using the budget constraints (4) and (5), the saving rate
si (rt+1) becomes: si (rt+1) =
£
1 + rt+1z−1i (rt+1)
¤−1
.
Elasticity of U∗i . Under Assumption 2, the Euler identity applies and, jointly
with (6), gives30:
Ui (1− si, sirt+1) = (1− si)Ui1 + siUi2rt+1 = Ui1 (33)
Using (33) and still (6), we have:
U∗0i (rt+1) rt+1 = [(Ui2rt+1 − Ui1) s0i + Ui2si] rt+1 = siUi2rt+1 = siUi1 = siU∗i
g (A) is an increasing function. The elasticity of g is computed from (10):
g0 (A)A
g (A)
= 1− λ1s1 (1− s1) (1− η1) + λ2s2 (1− s2) (1− η2)
λ1s1 + λ2s2
> 1− λ1s1 (1− s1) + λ2s2 (1− s2)
λ1s1 + λ2s2
> 0
since ηi > 0 for i = 1, 2.
30 In the sequel, we drop the unnecessary arguments of the functions.
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Determinant D and trace T of the Jacobian matrix J. Using (1), (2)
and Assumption 1, we first compute the factor price elasticities. Denoting by
ri and wi, i ∈ {k, l}, the derivatives of the real interest rate and the real wage
with respect to k and l, we have:
∙
krk/r lrl/r
kwk/w lwl/w
¸
=
∙
− (1− α) /σ (1− α) /σ + εψ
α/σ −α/σ + εψ
¸
(34)
With the notation (li1, li2, li3, li4) ≡ (∂li/∂kt−1, ∂li/∂lt, ∂li/∂kt, ∂li/∂lt+1),
the elasticities of labor supply εij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , 4, are defined and obtained
from equations (13) as follows:
∙
εi1 εi2
εi3 εi4
¸
≡
"
kli1
li
lli2
li
kli3
li
lli4
li
#
=
"
1
εvi
α
σ −
1
εvi
¡α
σ − εψ
¢
− siεvi
1−α
σ
si
εvi
¡
1−α
σ + εψ
¢ # (35)
after using the elasticities of U∗i (r) and v
0
i (li). Finally, define:
ε˜i3 ≡ εi3 − (1− si) (ηi − 1) (1− α) /σ (36)
ε˜i4 ≡ εi4 + (1− si) (ηi − 1) [(1− α) /σ + εψ] (37)
We linearize system (11)-(12) around the steady state (k, l) = (1, 1) with
l1 = l2 = 1 and we write the system in terms of elasticities (34). Equations (11)
and (12) become, respectively:
[1− (λ1s1ε˜13 + λ2s2ε˜23)w]
dkt
k
− (λ1s1ε˜14 + λ2s2ε˜24)w
dlt+1
l
= [(λ1s1ε11
+ λ2s2ε21)w + α/σ]
dkt−1
k
+ [(λ1s1ε12 + λ2s2ε22)w − (α/σ − εψ)]
dlt
l
(38)
and
− (λ1ε13 + λ2ε23)
dkt
k
− (λ1ε14 + λ2ε24)
dlt+1
l
= (λ1ε11 + λ2ε21)
dkt−1
k
+ (λ1ε12 + λ2ε22 − 1)
dlt
l
(39)
where w = 1/s is the stationary wage. Define now mn ≡ μ1sn1/εv1 + μ2sn2/εv2 ,
with μi ≡ λisi/ (λ1s1 + λ2s2) and n = −1, 0, 1. Substituting (35), (36) and
(37) in (38)-(39), we obtain the system (dkt/k, dlt+1/l)
T
= J (dkt−1/k, dlt/l)
T ,
where:
J =
∙
1−α
σ +
1
εs+m1
−1−ασ − εψ
1−α
σ −
1−α
σ − εψ
¸−1 ∙ α
σ
m0+1
m1+εs
¡
εψ − ασ
¢ m0+1
m1+εs
α
σ
m−1
m0
¡
εψ − ασ
¢ m−1
m0
− 1sm0
¸
is the Jacobian matrix. The determinant and the trace of this matrix are:
D =
1 +m0
sm0
α
1− α+ σεψ
T = D − m−1
m0
+
σ + sm−1 − (m0 + 1) (α− sm0εψ) + (m1 + εs) (1− α− sm−1εψ)
sm0 (1− α+ σεψ)
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In particular, according to Assumption 3, εv1 = εv2 ≡ εv which implies
m−1 = s−1/εv, m0 = 1/εv, m1 = (μ1s1 + μ2s2) /εv. Using these expressions,
we finally obtain:
D =
wα (1 + εv)
1− α+ σεψ
T = D − w
+
εψ (1 + 1/εv) + w (1− α+ (σ − α) εv + (m1 + εs) [(1− α) εv − εψ])
1− α+ σεψ
or, equivalently, (18)-(19).
Proof of ∂εvF /∂h > 0. εvF is defined by 1 + T +D = 0. Let
a ≡ σ + α+ εs (1− α) > 0
b ≡ 2 [α+ s (1− α)] + εψ [s− εs − σ (1− s)]
Using (18) and (19), εvF is solution of the following equation:
ε2va+ εv [b+ (1− α)h/s]− εψh/s = 0
More explicitly,
εvF =
−b− (1− α) hs +
q£
b+ (1− α) hs
¤2
+ 4aεψ hs
2a
(40)
∂εvF
∂h
=
1− α
2as
⎛
⎝ b+ (1− α)
h
s +
2aεψ
1−αq£
b+ (1− α) hs
¤2
+ 4aεψ hs
− 1
⎞
⎠
We notice that ∂εvF /∂h > 0 iﬀ
0 < b+
aεψ
1− α < b+ (1− α)
h
s
+
2aεψ
1− α
which is always true.
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